[Discussion] Adjustable emissions Cap

The truth is, beyond what is required to maintain your class, there is no benefit to holding GRAPE. At that point, it’s just price speculation.

So I think the focus is off. Instead of complex mechanisms to incentivize only skill roles to hold, come up with mechanisms that will be value add for everyone, both skill roles and not, to hold GRAPE. Instead of punishment, think of value creation.

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I buy this idea. I believe this would drive for everyone with a skill role to hold their tokens if we go in this direction as no one would wish to be capped. We could put the cap power in our hands meaning if you sold your grape, you become capped instantly during the next emission

I think the focus on value creation is so on point Big D. Providing reasons for holding more Grape beyond price speculation for everyone is really the best way to go. As Grape has a social focus, I was thinking how places like Amex / Visa for top tier members get perks to tickets, events, etc could be applied as things expand in the crypto world. And if so, perhaps the benefits could be tiered (Gold / Silver / Bronze) much like what is done already at the class level but outside of grape. Grape is growing in its reach and as it gets bigger and with that has more power. So for the added value, encouraging projects that want Grape “promotion / members” on their platform to offer things beyond just IDO tickets. This could come in many forms such as elevated access to their projects, beta testing access, free bonuses (i.e. STEPN could have a brand of grape running shoes that does certain things for members that only grape members get), more likelihood you get a rare mint on NTFs, etc. I know there are logistics here but if the community is big enough then these sort of things would be no-brainers for projects that will soon be fighting for attention to do. Focus is to get to a point where it makes it fun and positive to show your “badge” around the crypto sphere and seems a cool way to add value (that should not dilute the treasury). Twitch/Amazon Prime does this for some in-game bonuses that are time dropped so it could be across the metaverse. Imagine “bonuses/perks” that would be available to grape members across Solana in this fashion. Perhaps the use of a recognized NFT badge of honour may be one way to go as a basis for this. Sorry if I am off the mark here on my ramblings as I am trying to get up to speed. I hope some of this is new and worthy of consideration by this great group.

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This isnt 100% updated at least for my emissions and a few others I can see!

This was the last emission as the title says. This is what would have happened based on the roles for December. Yes, you are right, the numbers have changed since then

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Strongly oppose unlimited cap.
Yes, this disincentives those working multiple jobs and contributing everything they have every second.

Know what’s worse?

People coming to grape ( with a vision of decentralization) and seeing a select few key members gobbling up all the grape they can get. all of a sudden, the protocol or group is very centralised. With a heavy dependence on a few people.
These few people decide to leave?
you have a shell of an organisation that will either fail or struggle enormously due to either token price depreciation from those leaving or a broken infrastructure that depended heavily on a few people.

A cap IMO is a reality check, you are not more important than the next person, yes you do more work and are compensated, but this does not mean UNLIMITED NO CAP grape.

The question is to have a cap but make sure to still incentivise those who do the most work.

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Ser Billy in the last meeting we had on Sunday said there wasn’t much of a difference in the emissions of the the grape received was capped or what would have happened if last months emissions were not capped. Said it was an addition of about 200k grape or something like that @MetaVerse_Explorer

I’m not sure if you read all the above discussion, but I believe I’ve already addressed this point. The way to prevent one person from getting more GRAPE than they deserve is to self-police at the subDAO level. If they are receiving more than the work they are putting in, the subDAO needs to recognize this and reduce emissions for that individual. If they are putting in commensurate work for the amount they receive, then why disincentivize them from continuing to put in that work?

On a more practical level, there is no one who would receive insane amounts of GRAPE. Based on the data Dean provided, I’m the only individual who would receive more than 2x the current cap and there are only 15 individuals who would receive more than the cap, so practically speaking this wouldn’t be much of a centralizing force. Also, it makes simple sense that those who contribute more have a greater stake in the protocol. A cap basically says “beyond a certain point, we don’t want your contributions, at least not enough to compensate you for it”, and to me this would be much worse than the small increase in centralization a no cap system entails.

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“self-police at the subDAO level” agree here with a CAP.
“no one who would receive insane amounts of GRAPE” over longer epochs and a decreasing workforce yes they will.
“much worse than the small increase in centralization a no cap system entails” Isnt this why we are here though? to create an army of tiny soldiers rather than few big soldiers.

It seems the vote will pass anyway so I retire and just go with the flow~

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Let’s take community creators as an example. We gradually realized that we had members who were not contributing. Did a cap solve this problem for us? No. We had to kick them out. A cap is a very crude mechanism that can only police at the inter-subDAO level. If someone earns 20k in two subDAOs so 40k total, the cap will reduce it to 30k. But if they are fully earning that 20k in both subDAOs, the cap isn’t “policing” anything, it’s just an artificial upper limit.

Do you expect our workforce to decease over time? I definitely expect it to increase.

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Your dissent matters even if it is a sure vote the other way. For example, I think you made a great point about the potential for consolidation of “power” and a resulting centralization. However, I differ in opinion about caps being the right way to prevent that. I imagine a more effective solution is one were SubDAOs strictly police their tiers and perhaps a limit on the number of roles (this might be extreme). Just my thoughts. Glad you shared yours.

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I agree with @Durden’s view here.

  • People with multiple roles and earning top-tier of GRAPE in each sub-DAO would be outliers in the bell curve and policymaking shouldn’t be targeted at outliers.

  • If any, a CAP should be on the number of sub-DAOs a person can join. The argument is it shouldn’t be humanly possible to create top value for all the sub-DAOs a person will join. I’m unware of the existing way of work here so excuse my ignorance. If there is already a cap on the sub-DAOs, I don’t believe there is a need for an overall emissions CAP.

  • Once a person is a part of the sub-DAO, it’s the sub-DAO’s prerogative how the emissions are handled and to whom. If the protocol and by extension a sub-DAO grows its member base, each member might get less of the overall GRAPE allocated for the sub-DAO but in theory the Sats value of GRAPE received should be a net positive if the increased member base is reflecting in increase value created. If that is not the case, I’d argue we’d have more pressing concerns on value creation by the protocol as opposed to emissions.

  • Regarding @Arximedis point on exceeding overall cap, it won’t if they the budgets for epochs are set right. If a sub-DAO member is removed or demoted in terms of emission tiers during the epoch, the GRAPE that was budgeted and not consumed can simply be returned to the treasury.

  • Agree on @Whale_s_Friend’s view on incentivizing holding rather than a cap. By this I don’t mean more GRAPE for holding, maybe more weight to votes? Not sure how this can be implemented on-chain.

  • On @Tariqstp1’s view that you should be capped if you sold. Assuming the emissions were earned in the first place, I see no reason why it should matter if a person sells his/her rewards.

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hoping we can utilize the staking/bonding proposal that will pass soon enough and incorporate it into skill roles emissions paster a certain number

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I believe the message we should be sending is that anyone can become a part of the GRAPE community, put in the effort and “own” that much more of the protocol. If there are members with multiple sub-DAO roles delivering across their roles and getting uncapped rewards, it incentivizes others to follow. In theory this distribution should normalize over time with more people competing for these rewards.

In my opinion, this is a more existential question applicable to DAOs in general especially ones in infancy like Grape. I believe a bigger discussion is in order around why that will happen (the circumstances that will lead to it), mitigation and contingencies.

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Hypothetical Formula to enable dynamic allocation that would inherently reward users according to their contributions to one or more subDAOs.

Cap implies there are limits. Caps already exist in 2 varying extremes realistically. I think it may be simplest to just define this as a Base & Bonus, respectively.

Scenario A) DAO or SubDAO has budget X and all members Y are 100% eligible to receive their full emissions and have done outstanding work, equally weighted in merit, value, and objective or subjective importance, then eligibility for those rewards is simply X/Y, where emissions are equally divided amongst all members - which is an inherent cap defined by allocation available.

Scenario B) Complimenting the model from Scenario A, roles or emissions eligible members should only be assigned to individuals who earn the right to maintain a role and/or right to earn rewards based on performance in a given Epoch, thus the total emissions allocatable on each SubDAO should be attributable to their maximum available per SubDAO, but a maximum should be permitted that can adjust according to the overall participation of each respective SubDAO, and all SubDAOs overall.

Using these scenarios, I am attempting to express multiple views that are not mutually exclusive but inherent parts of the a more holistic & dynamic set of at least 4 criteria that define emissions eligibility:

  1. role assignment & management
  2. performance & participation tracking
  3. value & activity attribution
  4. popular & voting opinion

Scenario C) Using Scenario B, while this only depicts 1 SubDAO, if this model were applied to capture the weighted average performance % of any member with multiple Skill Roles, adding a factor or weight for diminishing marginal returns, the cap could be determined dynamically per epoch according to the criteria outlined.

For example: SkillRole 1 Member deserves 100% of Emissions for their efforts in producing for SubDAO 1, taking into account the overall possible number of members deserving of SkillRole Emissions. To ensure budget is always available to attribute to all members.

Scenario A - The Base Cap is defined by the highest available amount allocatable to all members, and attributed as a % of that cap. I.e. 100% earns a member the ability

Xa = Total GRAPE Budget Available for Group Base
Xb = Total GRAPE Budget Remaining for Group Bonus
Ya = Number of Members in the Base Group
Yb = Number of Members in the Bonus Group
BGa = Base Grape Emission for Group
BGb = Bonus Grape Emission for Group
PPs = Performance Percentage Score - Defines Base & Bonus Emissions allocated, in 2 phases.

If we incorporate each of the SubDAO emissions allocated per Skill Role, and average this out per User across all SubDAO performance, an added weight or factor for diminishing marginal returns appended on to this could help maintain a natural & dynamic cap for the available Emissions.

This example uses only 1 SubDAO to illustrate the model. Using a weighted average of the performance across ALL SubDAOs a member participates in, can help derive a Max Base, Max Bonus & Potential third output, which is Max Marginal Emissions for each Additional Role. If a Member has 4 Skill Roles, and performs at 100% in every SubDAO, they would be able to earn a maximum cap, that is defined by their Individual Merits, the Overall Performance of the SubDAO & their contributions to the Overall Performance of all SubDAOs they participated.

Forgive any simplicity here - This is merely a template to help describe a model. The final formula would first need to agree that this is an acceptable model to utilize that makes allocation uniform enough, while enabling the same level of earnings potential for high performers :wink:

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Omg i deleted previous cause there was a draft also.

What a great post ill print and put it on my wall.

I wil read it again ofc with all the details but should we choose between those scenarios?
or they serve example purposes?

what a nice post :heartpulse:

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Amazing work here brother. Very methodical and helpful for me to understand the possible paths for an Adjustable emissions Cap setup.

Only comments – if I may – is the popular / voting opinion to decide rewards is often a double-edged sword when accessing value but it has its place, of course, I suppose. When it comes to certain types of work (especially complex work), value and time spent are also not always in alignment as we know. While I recognize this may be somewhat outside the discussion here, it may be worth refining metrics and procedures. Defining parameters on what constitutes good value and how / when the popular opinion is warranted, it is worth some investigation as to when it is best applied.

A good example of this is accessing the value of a master pianist’s, if say for instance we were all musicians. A person that is not into piano or only casually plays may not be able to access the true value apart from knowing it is good. But only a fellow expert would be able to appreciate and value the brilliance. In cases like this perhaps simple voting might miss the mark as an illustration when we are assessing how the reward is decided.

I hope that does not muddy the waters… As a member of this DAO that wants to help make this a big success in the future (which I am sure we all want), I think ensuring we incentivize / encourage / attract those with exceptional talents to Grape within the realm of what is feasible in the long term is worth ensuring. Such that it is baked into the ultimate adjustable emissions calculations to help encourage and reward both groups of members.

Some of the cap removal discussions being made is in-part working around this very issue. I encourage us all to find a path that lifts up the up-and-coming and at the same time recognizes the “masters” for the value provided. In both cases, a focus on support and recognition beyond just the emissions themselves is where the real value is provided in an awesome community. Of course, the emissions are a bonus to get as “reward”.

Going to keep thinking this over and follow the discussions. I hope my 2 grapes are helpful somehow.

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