Moving forward with a Meritocratic voting model is a big step forward for Grape
There are 3 models that have been proposed so far. The goal of this poll is to decide which one to begin with. These models can change and be tweaked later, but we need to agree on which of the 3 to pursue
TL;DR - POV: Thank all 3 members for sharing these ideas and taking the time to write up proposals.
As a courtesy, I’ve written some feedback for each as best as I could understand the models - which are all close to the objective, but do have Pro’s & Con’s. The $GRAPE Token (or whatever represents governance voting weight) should maintain it’s base weight and value in governance. The fact that that’s not explicitly called out that models can be modified by vote - makes it very difficult for me to accept any of the models…but I chose one to start.
To recap my perception of these models:
Models suggest some input qualifying metrics and multipliers that amplify or enable some amount of Grape holding based on the trends of these inputs/metrics.
Multiplier logic impacts reputation and voting weight of Grape Amount Held.
Inputs for reputation vary across models, specifically the number of inputs that would need to included or considered. For example: Proposal Creation or Mee6 or Grape Holdings/Sale over time, are more impactful in some models than others.
More inputs = More data points to consider = Operational or Technical implementation to support. At least 2 of the Formulas overcompensate specific activities or present overbearing reputation boosts for tasks that shouldn’t blindly be rewarded with $GRAPE AND provide order of magnitude (10x or 100x) reputation multipliers - which become self-serving, especially if reputation can affecting “voting” weight in the future!!!
Formulas that allow for “0” in one area to cause entire formula to yield “0” reputation v.s. additive reputation scoring are considerably different propositions, even if the proposals “look” similar.
Simplest starting point for Realms Proposal & Voting Participation. votesByTime, > createdProposalsByTime, passedProposalsByTime, and, emissionsByTime
Accounts for the potential centralizing factors by measuring the “percentOwnership” - to provide visibility into the Cons
With the exception of the orders of magnitude multipliers and lacking clarity on the time considerations - This may be the simplest and best place to start - also because there are data points to reference showing the metrics are already there.
Cons:
Time weighting or clarification as to how time affects different users/weights is unclear.
Orders of Magnitude: Multipliers increase by orders of magnitude per activity - Voting or Proposals. There is no value in rewarding emissions and reputation, unless emissions are deemed the core reputation weight.
Thesis is that proposals are “rare”, but existing incentives discussions to reward users for Proposal Creation AND provide an order of magnitude reputation multiplier are excessively indexing the contribution value to Realms DAO Proposal Creation, in addition to negating users who do not propose - which implies MORE proposals that may not actually contribute value - but increase the amount of time and effort for DAO to review increased number of proposals, rather than incentivize increase in quality proposals.
Assuming all “successful” proposals are quality proposals and giving a significant reputation multiplier to proposal creation, gives proposal creator more power to continuously create “successful” proposals over time, unless all other proposal creators create, succeed, receive rewards, AND, gain reputation.
Question: Multipliers going from 0 to 100x to 1000x => Why are either of these so high (in more than one proposal)? Why not use logic to add weight to $GRAPE Holdings as the base, but make multiplier 1.Xx (i.e. 1.9x), 2.Xx (2.9x), or even 9x at most? I don’t see the value in giving reputation weights for tasks that can be gamed or manipulated by one or more participants.
Percentage-based with multiple inputs across 3 categories of behavior is the best way to approach including multiple inputs that could contribute.
Weighted formula which ensures some value indexed by a comprehensive set of inputs (both a Pro & Con)
Discussions suggested a potential review and change to model to remove perceived “Con” - impacting reputation due to “sell/transfer” of Grape Holdings.
Cons:
Comprehensive set of inputs (both a Pro & Con) = I would request to remove or alter some.
Unclear how reputation is calculated - unless the Percentage is just the Reputation Score. Is there a multiplier or % of $GRAPE accounted for - Unclear.
Percentage weighting makes it possible to “reduce” value of Grape Token holdings which are the core thesis of $GRAPE Governance weights for proposal creation and voting.
While a list of comprehensive inputs have been outlined, the potential for a contributor to gain reputation for work not classified is not encompassed (i.e. Developer contributions in GitHub, articles written for Grape or supported initiatives NOT bounty oriented, and a range of other positive behavior that could add to a users reputation.)
Consider: Any chance we could remove specific metrics discussed and add/remove later with DAO vote?
Time-weighting factor “over time” is key that other models may have neglected to address explicitly. This tiered approach appears to implement a 3-month and 6-month look back period at higher tiers, but the trade-off is outlined below.
Allowing a threshold of metric validity (>80%) sets a good precedent for users to understand the minimum viable activity requirements (MVAR) to gain reputation or not.
Explicitly Calls out the 33,333 $GRAPE holding requirement that must be maintained to secure Grape Great Ape, DAO Eligible or DAO Member (whichever terms appeal to each of us )
Does not penalize holders who reduce Grape Holdings which allows for someone to change their mind and avoid being set back or penalized for behavior that only affects them as an individual. Members can ramp up within 6 Months to top tier.
Simple enough to comprehend and understand which activities are required, time required, and their weights.
Cons:
3 Tiers are drastically differentiated by how much more the weights impact reputation which is reminiscent of the old 3 Class Grape membership model that was recently voted out by the community and simplified.
Orders of Magnitude: Multipliers increase by orders of magnitude per tier and heavily indexed on specific criteria. I.e. 10K Grape for a DAO Voter (2X) v.s. Member (20X) v.s. Core (100X) → This presents the potential for a member to receive voting weight that makes others insignificant based on qualifying inputs.
Formula for an active participant that did everything except submit a proposal would render qualification and reputation score Null? [Formula below:]
Existing incentives discussions to reward users for Proposal Creation AND provide an order of magnitude reputation multiplier are excessively indexing the contribution value to Realms DAO Proposals, in addition to negating users who do not propose - which implies MORE proposals that may or may not actually contribute value - but increase the amount of time and effort for DAO to review increased number of proposals, rather than incentivize increase in quality proposals.
Assuming all “successful” proposals are quality proposals and giving a significant reputation multiplier to proposal creation, gives proposal creator more power to continuously create “successful” proposals over time, unless all other proposal creators create, succeed, receive rewards, AND, gain reputation.
Formula Example (+t# = +MonthsCount: Qualifier = mee6+t6 * vote>80%+t6 * bountyemission+t1 * ProposalCreatorSuccess+t1 * $GRAPEHolding+t1 → any of these inputs are 0 and user is disqualified from an Order of magnitude affect?
In My Humble Opinion (IMHO)
Grape Token voting weight is one of the key inputs to any reputation considerations. A multiplier creates various effects - either dynamic or static - percentage or multiplier.
The value of the token should be considered as a key input that maintains it’s base value and accounts for a holder gaining more weight atop their base holding, within limits - because reputation models proposed could have centralizing effects in collective decisioning.
As a follow up to the DAO call and to address some of the points in Arximedes’s post, I’ve put together my thoughts on next steps and how to move forward.
tl;dr We’ll need to do this step-by-step because the selected model is both ambitious and complex.
