PROPOSAL: DAO Organizational Updates - GRAPE Councils

1. Proposal Purpose:

I.) Reinforce and improve the ability for the DAO & SubDAO’s to engage and execute with greater efficiency, whilst maintaining a level of security and protections against potential centralization or manipulation. Evaluating multiple blockchain consensus models, and cross-referencing other popular DAO organizations, this proposal seeks to explore the opportunity within GRAPE to augment the organizational structure by implementing an intermediary level of limited delegated authority to a set of individuals selected based on willingness, merit and democratic process.

II.) A new role defined as an assembly or “Council” is defined as a dedicated set of individuals responsible for the management, maintenance, documentation, upkeep, tracking, assignment, and, transparency of DAO & SubDAO initiatives, proposals, or, tasks. Current state of the DAO &/or SubDAOs are a unique groups of individuals with equal authority and voting weight that must meet certain requirements to participate in proposals, voting and decisioning for the Root & Sub DAO’s. Example: DAO Members must be Class A “Gorilla” and maintain a Skill Role. SubDAO members must maintain a Skill Role associated with their respective skill/SubDAO.

2. Grape Proposal Overview:

I.) Overview: To further solidify the structure of governance, engagement and execution, this proposal suggest to establish a new role that would comprise a set of unique groups called “Councils”. Council members would be tasked with operational, documentation and status tracking of proposals, consensus and execution of initiatives with respective stakeholders responsible for various tasks & requirements.

II.) Eligibility & Privileges:
A.) Council members must be an existing DAO or SubDAO member, meeting the initial requirements.
B.) No less than 2 individuals can occupy a council.
C.) No more than 5 members can occupy a council.
D.) Council members have the same voting rights as any DAO or SubDAO member, and, Council members are not permitted to supersede a DAO or SubDAO proposal that has not been appropriately voted upon or confirmed by DAO Council & DAO vote. [DAO and SubDAO members may also escalate to remove any Council member found to be violating their duties intentionally or unintentionally.]

III.) Organization: Councils are groups of a minimum of 2, but no more than 5 individuals. Currently, there are 1 root DAO and 6 subDAOs = 7 Groups with a maximum of 5 Council members each. Maximum number of collective Council Members to not exceed: 35

IV.) Process: To become a Council member, each DAO and each SubDAO must:
1.) Selection: Council Candidates must volunteer and make their intent known to the DAO or SubDAO.
2.) Vote: All DAO or SubDAO members must vote for the addition/removal of Council members
3.) Monitor: Council Members must self-police and DAO/SubDAO have the right to escalate for the removal of a Council Member.

V.) Responsibilities: Document, Coordinate, Manage, Maintain, and, Communicate
1.) Documentation & Revisions
2.) Proposal Review & Prioritization
3.) Proposal Status Tracking & Execution
4.) Schedule, Meetings and Meeting Minutes (Notes)
5.) Communicate / Coordinate DAO or SubDAO Agenda & Focus
6.) Potential: For DAO council - Monitoring and Maintaining records of Community Treasury execution carried out by Dedicated Treasury Council, and, SubDAO Council - Monitor and Maintaining any emissions related tasks relative to Treasury, Role Additions/Removals, and, Docs/Execution.

VI.) Incentives: Open to alternative approaches, below is a suggestion:
1.) Incentive: Council members will be eligible to receive Monthly Emissions every EPOCH.
2.) Emissions per Council Member (Fixed to Start): 1,000 SubDAO / 2,000 DAO
3.) Maximum Total Monthly Emissions: 50,000
4.) Future State: Implement Dynamic Emissions Rewards Pool divided by Participants according to merit (Conceptual - not subject to vote at present)

3. Stakeholders

I.) DAO to vote on Proposal. DAO and/or SubDAO members to vote for candidates & council members

II.) Cadence: In the last week of every Epoch or Quarter (4 Quarters = Jan-Mar, Apr-Jun, Jul-Sept, Oct-Dec):
A.) DAO and/or SubDAO member vote for Council Members to be added or removed from Council post by majority
B.) DAO & SubDAO will vote to confirm emissions for Council Members be attributed.
C.) Voting Requirements: To start, the majority implies a 51% or greater majority of all DAO or SubDAO member votes in favor of a particular decision. For every subsequent voting period, it is recommended that this threshold be increased to a 60% majority, by default.

4. Costs/Resource Requirements:

Maximum Total Monthly Emissions: 50,000 = 35 Council Members (30 SubDAO [1,000 GRAPE] & 5 DAO [2,000 GRAPE])

Approve Proposal to Form a DAO Council?
  • Yes
  • No
  • Abstain

0 voters

Approve Proposal to Form SubDAO Councils?
  • Yes
  • No
  • Abstain

0 voters

Approve Proposal for Emissions to Council Members?
  • Yes
  • No
  • Abstain
  • Disagree with the amounts

0 voters


Great draft! I can totally see this as a needed addition for the main DAO. For the subDAO on the other hand, I’m not sure. This may be partly due to the fact, that I’m not in a subDAO and never attended a subDAO meeting. Therefore I can’t say, how our subDAOs are organized and whether it’s a good idea to make this form of governance mandatory for them.
Maybe having a subDAO leader totally works for some subDAOs. And if any member has an issue with that, they can address this to their respective subDAO and in case there is no consensus, escalate it to the DAO.

In addition, I’m curious as to how certain tasks of a subDAO Council would differ from those of the subDAO Reps. If I understand you correctly, the subDAO Council would facilitate the operational side of a subDAO while the subDAO Reps communicate the subDAO’s intentions and handle everything regarding proposal creation, voting, and are in general, a point of contact for the rest of the community.

subDAO Council members can also become subDAO Reps, right?
Maybe you could elaborate on this a bit more.

Also, we could draft an additional process for choosing a subDAO Leader (or another form of governance) in order to give the subDAOs a choice. I need to think about this.

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This is actually a formal proposal which is a modification of some original concepts outlined in DAO research I shared in response to “single” leader delegate roles. Much of the research conducted and suggested frameworks outlined were documented before our DAO and SubDAO’s were formed, and proposed prior to the implementation of Discourse to facilitate enabling free and transparent proposals from any and all DAO members, to prevent centralization. Thus, this is a rearticulation of concepts enumerated in prior designs to fit the mold of our current DAO & SubDAO structures.

As to the relationship of these individuals to the DAO or SubDAO → Council members must be existing members of the respective DAO or SubDAOs, that would be undertaking a greater level of responsibility to their respective DAO and SubDAO’s.

To simplify this a bit, this would be the first form of delegated proof of social work, in that it limits authority and reduces the risks or vulnerabilities present in other popular delegated proof of stake models, which are prone to centralization, or, “efficient” leader-based approaches of other blockchains that claim to be decentralized, but don’t have the framework to support the claim. The fundamental differences between blockchain consensus models and DAOs is human behavior.

I hope this reference will help answer this question. The details are enumerated in the proposal Overview under point II. A & D. Council members are existing DAO & SubDAO members, or, representatives to align with the terminology you’re referring to. Council members are undertaking a duty, not receiving any additional privileges, and are incentivized to ensure DAO and/or SubDAO’s remain active and productive. After the formation of these groups, it may be deemed that they can be given some level of authority to execute certain sensitive or critical tasks, subject to future proposals and per collective majority vote of the DAO.

1 Like

Very well structured and thought out proposal. Ive voted Yes on all

2 thoughts id like to share

-subDAOs should be given as much autonomy as possible in how they reach their own decisions and elect roles (if any). The main DAO must be diligent in creating processes that subDAOs are required to follow – but should not enforce how those processes are fulfilled/achieved

-The reference to Team. As a goal, we need to rely on the community to grow outside of Team members, but referencing a Team is problematic. Its one of those things that we should implicitly know and support, but not explicitly outline.


are you a lawyer? Very well written!

I am curious if the proposed 2k or 1k GRAPE is enough for the type of work expected from these individuals.
For example, and not to pick on CC sub-dao, but even their tier 3 are alloted 5k GRAPE a month for what seems to be a fraction of the work outlined here.

Unless I am missing something or not understanding correctly from VI.) Incentives
Please let me know.


I agree a council is required for the dao/sub. this will help drive a more efficient decision making process.

I voted against incentives that these subdao members should be paid, Noted that the amounts are small in number however, added that these council members will be incentivied aswell as the secretary and president places alot of supply out into the wild.

IMO if people in their subdao don’t want to be actively involved in their subdao decisions they shouldn’t be in it. I ofcourse expect this vote to conclude on a Y.


@DAO - I will be requesting that this be a topic of discussion for Sunday’s 12/12/21 DAO call. Would appreciate review and possibly voting to help us reach consensus on whether this is a model we want to implement to help solidify and grow the DAO & SubDAOs.


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